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Abstract
Since its application to systems, emergence has been explained in terms of levels
of observation. This approach has led to confusion, contradiction, incoherence
and at times mysticism. When the idea of level is replaced by a framework of
scope, resolution and state, this confusion is dissolved. We find that emergent
properties are determined by the relationship between the scope of macrostate
and microstate descriptions. This establishes a normative definition of emer-
gent properties and emergence that makes sense of previous descriptive defini-
tions of emergence. In particular, this framework sheds light on which classes
of emergent properties are epistemic and which are ontological, and identifies
fundamental limits to our ability to capture emergence in formal systems.
1 Introduction
The early development of emergence in the philosophical literature was in the context
of the emergence of vitality from chemistry, and the emergence of minds from biology.
This promoted the importance of understanding emergence, as a potential explanation not
only of the relation between the general and special sciences, but also of the evolution
of life, intelligence and complexity. Yet with its dual edge, the sword of the Emergentist
philosophers carved out an overly ambitious research agenda, which set as its subject
domain processes that are still largely impenetrable to science. Section 2 briefly reviews
this history, a discourse that has largely obscured the fact that at heart, emergent properties
are simply a difference between global and local structure.
The purpose of this paper is to advance a new definition of emergent properties and emer-
gence. Emergence is an essential pillar of every systems approach, and yet no precise,
well defined account of emergence has achieved any level of consensus among systems
researchers. The current surge of interest in complex systems – arguably the systems
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approach that seeks the closest integration with science – desperately lacks a clear under-
standing of emergence. For systems theory to be relevant to empirical experimentation,
exact, testable concepts are necessary. It is not unreasonable to expect that achieving co-
herence on what it means for a system to have emergent properties, and when this counts
as emergence, would lead to significant advances in systems research. We suggest that
the current murkiness surrounding the central concepts in complex systems represents a
serious impediment to progress. Clarifying emergence is an important step towards en-
hancing communication within the systems community. Even more importantly, it can
improve communication with other fields of inquiry, enabling – among other possibilities –
the application of exact systems concepts in science.
The approach taken in this study departs from the tradition of philosophical fascination in
the emergence of life, consciousness and the universe. Undoubtedly, the most interesting
exemplars of emergence are complex, highly evolved, and probably even self-organising.
However, for emergence to be a useful and unambiguous distinction, firstly it must be
isolable in a more basic form. Secondly, it must be understood in terms of well defined
primitives. In Section 3, we find that the conventional account in terms of levels and hier-
archy does not meet our second criterion, so an alternative framework of scope, resolution
and state is defined. In Section 4, an emergent property is defined, and simple examples
show that novel emergent properties are coupled to scope. Section 5 defines emergence
as the process whereby novel emergent properties are created, and examines the relation-
ship between emergence and predictability. Section 6 uses the definition of an emergent
property to outline a principled approach to determining the boundary of a system. We
consider the practical limitations of the definitions in Section 7, and point towards some
practical applications in Section 8.
2 A short history of emergence
The notion of an emergent effect was first coined in 1875 by the philosopher George Lewes1
[25] to describe non-additive effects of causal interactions, to be contrasted with resultants.
According to Lewes,
Although each effect is the resultant of its components, we cannot always trace
the steps of the process, so as to see in the product the mode of operation of
each factor. In the latter case, we propose to call the effect an emergent. It
arises out of the combined agencies, but in a form which does not display the
agents in action ... Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-
operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference
when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable
1A precursor to emergence was the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, which is
usually attributed to Plato or Aristotle [4, 22]. Lewes was also influenced by Mill’s [31] description of
heteropathic effects, whose multiple simultaneous causes were not additive.
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in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable ... It
is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to
measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind,
there is a cooperation of things of unlike kinds ... The emergent is unlike its
components in so far as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced
to their sum or their difference.
Several new theories of emergence appeared in the 1920s. Lewes’ emergents were subtly
refined by Alexander [1, 2], Broad [11] and Lloyd Morgan [27, 28, 29], among others,
to support a layered view of nature. The concept of emergence as a relation between
simultaneous causes and their joint effect was translated to consider the upward causation
of composition. Emergence now focused on properties rather than dynamical interactions,
by considering the relationship between components and the whole they compose. This
view on emergence was held in contrast to reductionist mechanism, the ideal that all
apparently different kinds of matter are the same stuff, differing only in the number,
arrangement and movement of their constituent components [11, p45]. Although properties
of a complex whole were still simultaneously caused by the properties of components, novel
system properties were said to emerge if they could not, even in theory, be deduced from
complete knowledge of the properties of the components, either taken separately or in other
combinations. Emergent properties were therefore irreducible, and represented barriers to
mechanistic explanations. It was this conception of emergence that became the kernel of
the mid twentieth century systems movement, as summarised by Checkland [14]:
It is the concept of organized complexity which became the subject matter of
the new discipline ‘systems’; and the general model of organized complexity
is that there exists a hierarchy of levels of organization, each more complex
than the one below, a level being characterized by emergent properties which
do not exist at the lower level. Indeed, more than the fact that they ‘do not
exist’ at the lower level, emergent properties are meaningless in the language
appropriate to the lower level.
Although Checkland suggests that the levels of hierarchy are ordered by complexity, he
is in fact defining an emergence hierarchy2, and there is no necessary condition on higher
levels of organisation having greater complexity3. In any case, Checkland does explain the
standard argument for emergence clearly. In this account, the macro language contains
concepts that are meaningless at the micro level, in the way that it is meaningless to talk
about flocking as a property of a single bird. It is important to emphasise that this does
not claim we cannot map between sets of microstate descriptions to macrostates: it is
2An emergence hierarchy is a system view from a structural perspective made on the basis of the
existence of emergent properties [13].
3Bar-Yam [6, p5, p746] provides several examples of emergent simplicity. Whether higher levels of an
emergence hierarchy are necessarily more complex is dependent on whether the hierarchy is nested, and if
the scope and resolution of description is the same at all levels. Checkland is by no means the only author
to conflate an emergence hierarchy with increasing complexity; this has been common practice since the
1920s.
a fundamental methodological assumption of science that such a mapping is in principle
possible4. Instead, it is the weaker assertion that when any component of a system is viewed
in isolation, its microstate description cannot map to the associated emergent properties.
Since the systems movement adopted the conception of emergence as a relation between
levels, explanations of emergence have diverged to include a remarkable number of con-
tradictory positions. This includes a number of reductionist scientific explanations that
erase the distinction between emergent properties and mechanistic explanations, relegat-
ing emergence to the merely epiphenomenal5. Many other explanations tie emergence to
evolution, complexity and/or self-organisation, presenting a singular unintelligible knot
of concepts. Meanwhile, in contemporary philosophy a spectrum of conflicting positions,
broadly either epistemological or ontological approaches to emergence, have been articu-
lated with little headway made in either camp6. As the only commonality amongst the
alternative positions is their failure to gain sufficient traction to generate consensus, their
variety has only reinforced the status of emergence as an enigma.
3 Replacing level with scope and resolution
The conventional explanation of emergence presented in the previous section is unsatisfac-
tory. The use of an emergence hierarchy to account for emergent properties is alarmingly
circular, given that the levels are defined by the existence of emergent properties7. In
hierarchy theory, levels are most often considered to be epistemic, although seemingly only
to avoid the burden of proof that falls on an ontological position. Many hierarchy theorists
prefer to remain reality-agnostic [3]. Unsurprisingly, the inconclusive nature of levels means
that explanations of emergence in terms of levels of description are unable to resolve its
nature – is emergence a natural phenomenon or an artifact of the process of observation?
To bypass this impediment, we need to define emergence without invoking the concept of
levels, which we argue can be accomplished using scope, resolution and state8.
Scope is defined by a spatial boundary. Spatial is used in the broadest sense of the word
to include conceptual and formal, as well as physical spaces, provided the system has a
physical manifestation (spatial refers to the set of components, in contrast to temporal,
which refers to the dynamics of those components). The scope of a system representation
4The alternative position is a form of ontological pluralism, such as Cartesian substance dualism or
organismic vitalism, which discourages scientific investigation. This approach declares at least one explana-
tory primitive (the mind or e´lan vital) which is by definition non-material and inaccessible to science.
5See the survey on The Laws of Emergence in [16, p 24].
6Matthews [30, p203] describes this impasse; also see [32] for a review.
7For a sounder (but still not explanatory) account of emergence in terms of levels see [12].
8Bar-Yam [7] recognises the importance of scope, scale and the microstate-macrostate relation in under-
standing emergence, and consequently [7] is closer to the following account of emergence than the sources
covered in Section 2.
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is the set of components within the boundary between the associated system and its envi-
ronment. If an observer shifts from representing the system to representing a component,
such that the component is now the system of interest, the scope of observation has nar-
rowed. Conversely, when the scope is increased to include components that were previously
part of the environment, the scope has broadened. There is also a temporal dimension to
scope, which defines the set of moments of time over which the system is represented. S
denotes scope, while S(x) and S(τ) denote only the spatial and temporal dimensions of
scope respectively.
Resolution is defined as the finest spatial distinction between two alternative system config-
urations. If a fine (high) and a coarse (low) resolution representation have the same scope,
the fine resolution can distinguish a greater number of possibilities, n, and therefore each
state contains more (Shannon) information, H = −
∑n
i=1 pi log(pi) = log(n), assuming all
states are equiprobable. A closely related concept is scale, which is a transformation by
multiplication. The connection is that as a property is scaled up (multiplied) within a
system, it can be detected at coarser resolutions. The distinction (which is rarely made)
is that scale is independent of how the system is represented, whereas resolution is an at-
tribute of the representation (scale is ontological, but resolution is epistemological). Once
the resolution is set, this determines the ‘size’ of the components that comprise the system.
There is also a temporal dimension to resolution, which defines the duration of a moment
in time, where longer moments represent coarser (lower) resolutions. R denotes resolu-
tion, while R(x) and R(τ) denote only the spatial and temporal dimensions of resolution
respectively.
The state of a system is the information that distinguishes between alternative system
configurations up to some resolution at one moment in time. Macrostate M and microstate
µ denote sets of states with two different resolutions and scopes, with the following macro-
to-micro relations:
RM ≤ Rµ (1)
SM ≥ Sµ (2)
(RM,SM) 6= (Rµ,Sµ) (3)
Intuitively, the macrostate has either a coarser resolution or a broader scope, or both. Let
M′ ∈ MM and µ
′ ∈ Mµ denote the sets of M
′|µ and µ′|M respectively satisfying Eqns. 1-3.
Also note that M and µ represent sets of states if S(τ) > 1. This non-standard usage of
the terms enables the representation of ensembles, and allows for emergent properties to
be structured in time as well as space.
There exist other factors that influence the representation of a system by an observer.
They include perspective (some information at a particular resolution is hidden eg. the
state of internal organs to the naked eye) and interpretation (eg. optical illusions that have
multiple valid interpretations). However, we do not need to invoke these factors to account
for emergence, so for simplicity they are excluded.
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4 Emergent properties
Definition 1 (Emergent property). A property is emergent iff it is present in a macrostate
and it is not present in the microstate.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to impose any limitations on how the presence of
emergent properties are inferred, provided the same methods are available in M and µ.
The application of a set of methods designed to infer whether an emergent property is
present or not constitutes a decision procedure. If the decision procedure returns a value
of 1, informally we say the property has been detected. Ideally, an emergent property
should be consistently present in an ensemble, to distinguish an emergent property from
a statistically unlikely transient pattern (such as a recognisable image appearing in one
frame of white noise). For a macrostate M, PMµ (t) = {p1, p2, ..., pn} is the set of emergent
properties present in M and not present in µ at time t. If SM(τ) > 1, then t indicates the
most recent moment in SM(τ).
It follows from the definition that emergent properties must be the result of spatially or
temporally extended structures, since otherwise it would be trivial to detect their presence
in the microstate. By structure, we mean there is a pattern that relates the components,
which implies redundancy, and therefore the description of the components is compressible.
Structure means the components are ‘organised’ in the sense Ashby [5] intended: commu-
nication (in some generalised sense) occurs between components to act like a constraint
in the product space of possibilities. A corollary is if the components are independent,
they cannot give rise to emergent properties. Consequently a Gaussian distribution is not
organised, nor is it an emergent property of IID components. The law of large numbers
is a statement about the loss of structure, not the emergence of new structure. Further,
superpositionality, averaging and other linear operations cannot be the source of emergent
properties. This is because a linear operator evaluates equally for any arrangement of
the components. Because addition is commutative, linear operations capture a common
feature of a set of components independent of their organisation, so the global structure
is always exactly the sum of its parts. Lewe’s original insight on emergents can now be
restated: nonlinearity is a necessary condition for emergent properties.
So far, we have not specified which M ∈ MM and µ ∈ Mµ were chosen as the macrostate
and microstate in Defn. 1. Given that ∃pi ∈ PM(t), we would like to know if pi is a result
of a change of resolution or scope. Both cases are now considered, by holding one of the
two variables equal between the macrostate and the associated microstate.
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4.1 Class I: Weak emergent properties
For the first case let SM = Sµ, which by Eqns. (1) and (3) implies RM < Rµ. Hence,
H(M) < H(µ). Let the surjective map9 C : Mµ → MM give the coarsegrained macrostate
corresponding to the microstate µ. By Defn. 1, a decision procedure exists to detect pi
in M. But if pi can be detected in M = C(µ), it can also be detected in µ by applying C,
followed by the decision procedure for M. Therefore, in this case, the presence of pi in M
implies the presence of pi in µ.
The difficulty with determining the presence of emergent properties arises from finding the
map C in the first place: it represents ‘hidden structure’, rather than ‘novel structure’.
This problem reduces to a combinatorial search problem for the mapping that reveals the
relationship between the structure hidden in µ, and its more apparent representation in
M. The worst scenario is if C is non-recursive, in which case the procedure for detection
outlined above is incomputable. However, it is unknown whether physical processes exist
that are capable of performing non-recursive mappings10. Aside from incomputability, the
most challenging case is an incompressible iterative function, such that C involves a large
but finite number of transformations. For example, consider a simulation of a discrete time
dynamical system, where µ is a vector of the initial conditions and updating rules, and M
is the binary terminal state of the simulation. C is incompressible if the most efficient way
to infer M given µ is by running the simulation11.
Properties in this case are classified as weak emergent properties, which is consistent with
Bar-Yam’s [7, p17] definition of “the relationship of microscopic and macroscopic views of a
system that differ only in precision”. A weak emergent property is epistemic, since once we
have discovered the right mapping C, by Defn. 1 it can no longer be considered emergent.
Even in the extreme case of incomputability, it is a limitation in our ability to detect the
property that creates the appearance of it being emergent. In other words, we only believe a
weak emergent property is not present in µ because of practical or fundamental limitations
in our ability to detect and deduce the consequences of the structures that give rise to
the emergent property in M. When practical limitations are the cause, a weak emergent
property may appear to be emergent to one observer, but is not emergent to an observer
with a deeper understanding of the microstate12. Within the assumptions and definitions
of this study, if resolution is the only difference between a macrostate and microstate, no
9That such a function exists is the fundamental methodological assumption of science referred to in
Section 2.
10See [15] for a review of the possibility of physical processes whose behaviour conforms to non-recursive
mappings.
11This corresponds to Darley’s [17] definition: “A true emergent phenomenon is one for which the optimal
means of prediction is simulation”. Holland’s [23] book on emergence takes a very similar approach, without
committing to a precise definition.
12In the literature, note that the label ‘weak’ is rarely used by proponents of this position. However,
a purely epistemic conception of emergence is usually revealed by the assignment of emergence to the
relationship between the observer and the system. A good example is Weinberg [36, p60], who states “We
can always find cases in which a property will be ‘emergent’ to one observer and ‘predictable’ to another”.
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property of the macrostate can be genuinely emergent from the microstate.
The class of weak emergent properties can be summarised by the following definition.
Definition 2 (Weak Emergent Property). A property is weakly emergent iff it is
present in a macrostate but it is not apparent in the microstate, and this macrostate differs
from the microstate only in resolution. A weak emergent property is a limitation of the
observer, not a property of the system.
4.2 Class II: Novel emergent properties
For the second case let RM = Rµ, which by Eqns. (2) and (3) implies SM > Sµ. In this
case, H(M) > H(µ). We need to identify a macrostate with the smallest possible scope
that still exhibits pi.
Definition 3 (Minimal Macrostate). A macrostate M∗ is minimal with respect to an
emergent property, if the emergent property is present in M∗, and it is not present in any
µ with the same resolution and narrower scope (ie. in any proper subset of the components
of M∗).
M∗ is not necessarily unique, since if two components are interchangeable, then there are
two distinct M∗ that can both satisfy Defn. 3. Three simple examples will show that M∗
can be well defined.
Firstly, consider a Mo¨bius strip, which is a one sided, one edged, non-orientable ‘surface
with boundary’. We can think of the Mo¨bius strip as being comprised of a singly twisted
loop of triangles, such as the tiling depicted in Figure 1. It can be shown that any compact
differentiable manifold allows a triangulation. RM∗ is determined by the number of triangles
used, and SM∗ equals the set of triangles. If we consider any proper subset by removing at
least one triangle, the resulting surface or surfaces are two sided, orientable and have more
than one edge. Formally, the Euler characteristic χ is 0 for a Mo¨bius strip, but equals the
number of disjoint simplicial (triangular) complexes in µ. This is equal to or greater than 1,
so M∗ is not topologically equivalent to any µ. Therefore, the properties associated with the
Mo¨bius strip are emergent properties of M∗ that do not exist for narrower scopes. Further,
as χ is a topological invariant, it does not depend on the resolution of the triangulation.
Hence, the emergent property is coupled to the scope of M∗, irrespective of which particular
surfaces we define as the components of M∗.
Secondly, a perfect secret sharing scheme divides some data D into n pieces D1, ..., Dn such
that:
1. Knowledge of any k or more Di pieces makes D easily computable; and
2. Knowledge of any k−1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely undetermined (in the
sense that all its possible values are equally likely).
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Figure 1: A Mo¨bius strip can be triangulated to show it has novel emergent properties.
An efficient perfect secret sharing scheme is presented in [34] based on polynomial in-
terpolation, where a random polynomial is chosen of degree k − 1 such that q(x) =
a0+a1x+...+ak−1x
k−1 has a0 = D and ai ∈ [0, p) are integer and bounded by a large prime
p. Then the keys Di ∈ Z are generated by Di = q(i) mod p, i = 1, .., n. Interpolation re-
trieves a unique value for a0 = D if at least k values of q(i) are known, but when k−1 values
are revealed to an opponent, all polynomials associated with possible secrets D′ are equally
likely – the mutual information I(D;D′) = 0. Thus when RM = Rµ = min(|Di−Di′ |) = 1
(ie. we can distinguish between each possible Di ∈ [0, p)) and SM∗ = k, then D is present
in M∗ and is not present in any µ. By construction, D is an emergent property that is
coupled to any M∗ with a scope of k.
The third example presents an instance where the emergent property depends on temporal
rather than spatial scope. Conceptually, there is no difference between structure extended
in space or time, except that communication can only move forwards in time, meaning
that structure can only constrain possibilities that are within the ‘future light cone’ of the
first component of the structure in the temporal scope. Consider a process governed by
the deterministic periodic discrete time iterative function
f(t+ Pn) = f(t) ∀t ∈ Z, (4)
where P ∈ Z+ is the period and n ∈ N is any multiple of P . The property of this sequence
is translational symmetry, which is present in M∗ when (RM∗(t),SM∗(t)) = (1, P + 1), and
is not present in any µ with a Sµ(t) ≤ P . This example is trivial, but the extension of the
idea of temporal emergent properties to general discrete dynamical systems includes far
more interesting structures.
This class of emergent property arises from structure that is extended over the scope of
the system, which we refer to as novel emergent properties. There is a difference between
local and global structure in any system that exhibits emergent novelty. This explains
why emergent novelty cannot be understood or predicted by an observer whose scope is
limited to only one component of a system. When the resolution of the macrostate equals
the resolution of the microstate (or the inverse mapping from the macrostate to a set of
microstates is known and well defined), emergent novelty is at least in part ontological. We
cannot say it is fully ontological, since some a priori concepts are used in this framework
9
to structure our analysis. However, the minimal macrostate has an objective property that
is independent of variations in the epistemic status of an observer.
Definition 4 (Novel Emergent Property). A property is a novel emergent property iff
it is present in a macrostate but it is not present in any microstate, where the microstates
differ from the macrostate only in scope.
One subclass of emergent novelty that has been discussed as a separate phenomenon in the
literature is ‘emergent behaviour’, which is a property of the system that is only exhibited
in certain environments. An example of emergent behaviour is the interaction between a
lock and a key13. The key is said to have an emergent behaviour, since it opens any door
containing a complementary lock, and this is not present in the microstate description of
the key in isolation. This property is only present in the macrostate when the spatial
scope of the system is expanded to include both the lock and the key. The emergent
behaviour can then be explained as complementary spatially extended structure between
two system components. From this analysis, we conclude that emergent behaviours are
the result of mistakenly attributing a novel emergent property of a system to one of its
components. While it is often convenient to keep the idealised system boundary fixed and
talk of emergent behaviours, at the same time we should be clear that the scope of the
emergent property extends between the system and certain contexts.
The classification of emergent properties has not considered the case that RM < Rµ and
SM > Sµ. This case is harder to analyse, since we cannot say whether H(M) is greater or
less than H(µ). Fortunately, because we can rule out resolution as a source of emergent
properties, the only important factor is scope. Therefore, we can coarsegrain µ so that
RM = Rµ, and which reduces it to Class II.
5 Emergence
So far we have analysed emergent properties without saying how they arise. This is the
process of emergence.
Definition 5 (Emergence). Emergence is the process whereby the assembly, breakdown
or restructuring of a system results in one or more novel emergent properties.
Assembly and breakdown are the dual processes of adding and removing interactions be-
tween system components that change the cardinality of the set of components in the
system, while restructuring changes interactions between components without changing
13Following Bar-Yam [7], we use this example for ease of comparison with what Bar-Yam calls ‘type
3 strong emergence’ or ‘environmental emergence’. Additionally, a popular example of emergence in the
literature is the smell of ammonia, which is said to emerge from the odourless nitrogen and hydrogen
components. What is not usually explained is that the smell of ammonia is a property of the relationship
between the gas and human olfactory receptors, and is therefore an example of environmental emergence.
According to ‘shape’ theories of olfaction, the interaction between ammonia molecules and the human
receptor system is not dissimilar to a lock and key.
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the cardinality. Some researchers claim that only self-assembling and self-restructuring
processes can emerge. For example, Holland [23] argues that emergence must be the prod-
uct of self-organisation, not centralised control. This is another example of attempting to
tie together separate concepts that are useful only if they have distinct meanings. It usually
leads to circular definitions (emergence is self-organising; self-organisation is a process that
gives rise to emergence), or greedy reductions (emergence is nothing-but self-organisation).
When an emergent property is reinforced by positive feedback, its scale is increased. How-
ever, it is important to emphasise that merely scaling an emergent property is not emer-
gence. The common use of the word does not make this distinction. For example, consider
the following observation on avian bird flu. “Despite the widespread emergence of H5N1
influenza viruses in poultry in many countries in Asia in early 2004, there were no out-
breaks of H5N1 influenza in poultry or humans in Hong Kong during this time.” [26] In
this case, “widespread emergence” is synonymous with “growth”. It refers to scaling of
the population infected by H5N1, rather than the assembly of the initial mutation of the
virus. Scaling is an important process, since if an emergent property is not reinforced it
cannot perpetuate or have a significant impact (consider a mutation that does not repli-
cate). However, the technical definition of emergence only applies to the initial process of
assembly.
Having made this distinction, we can now make a useful observation on the connection
between centralised control and emergence. Centralised control is characterised by a lack
of autonomy in the system’s components, except for the controller. The controller can
assemble (or breakdown or restructure) the other components of the system, which may
result in a spatiotemporally extended property. If this is performed by following some
template or blueprint, we can ask whether the emergent property is present in the template.
If so, then the property emerged within the controller, then was scaled up (which is not
emergence) as it was realised across the system’s components. If not, we can say the
property emerged in the system, even though it was assembled under central control from
a template. If there is no template, then the emergence also occurs in the system, not
the controller. Error-free, context-insensitive asexual replication can only scale existing
emergent properties, but the introduction of mutation, crossover, retroviruses or ‘nurture’
(ie. sensitivity to information from the environment) can lead to emergence. In summary,
emergence can occur through centralised control, provided the emergent property is not
already present in the controller.
Emergence is defined above as a process, which means it is temporally extended. That is,
emergence is not a property of a system at any point in time, it is a relationship between
system properties at two different moments in time. Let M have emergent properties
PM(t) = {p1, p2, ..., pn} at time t. At some later time t
′, the system’s emergent properties
are PM(t
′) = {p1, p2, ..., pn−r, pn+1, ..., pn+s}, with r, s ∈ N. If max{r, s} > 0, then at least
one new emergent property is present, or a previous emergent property no longer exists in
M. In either case, between t and t′, M exhibits emergence14.
14Note that every pi has a logical complement, ‘absence of pi’. Therefore the disappearance of pi is
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As a thought experiment, we can set Sµ to be unbounded in space and include all prior
moments in time. In this case, M with the same resolution and spatial scope contains
just one new moment in time. Now, if M contains a novel emergent property pˆi, then
pˆi has never existed before. For M
∗ such that pˆi ∈ PM∗, SM∗ contains a corresponding
structure whose specific configuration has likewise not occurred previously. We coin the
term ‘naissance emergence’ to refer to the original emergence of a novel emergent property
pˆi. Naissance emergence is the source of novelty, and is an important distinction for a
discussion of the relationship between emergence and predictability.
The problem for scientists aspiring to predict naissance emergence is that, by definition, pˆi
is not present until it is within temporal scope ie. until it has already occurred! Of course, a
scientist may have a theory about what properties may pertain for a configuration that has
not existed. But from Section 4, a theory that is a linear combination of properties of the
components in other subsets or configurations cannot give rise to a novel emergent property.
Therefore, any theory that claims to predict naissance emergence must extrapolate pˆi from
a nonlinear combination of previously observed properties. But if the extrapolation is
nonlinear, it is not unique. Therefore, our scientist must have multiple theories for pˆi, all
of which are possible. There is no logical way to choose between the candidate theories,
so a choice of pˆi can only be justified by empirical experiment. But by conducting the
experiment, pˆi is now within temporal scope. Consequently, pˆi cannot be predicted with
certainty until it has already occurred.
This implies that formal systems, including mathematical models and computer simula-
tions, are incapable of reproducing naissance emergence. This does not mean that once
naissance emergence has occurred that we cannot alter our models to include pˆi and as-
sociate it with some M∗. It just means that we cannot do it a priori, because we require
empirical access to select between the possible properties of completely new configurations.
Naissance emergence is an ontological concept, since in light of the preceding discussion it
cannot be epistemic.
6 Rethinking System Boundaries
Interestingly, the view of emergent properties developed in this study presents an alter-
native way of defining the boundary of a system. It is rare that the process of system
definition is treated explicitly. However, it is suggested that the following process is typ-
ical. Firstly, the system boundary is chosen to separate the system from its environment
where the interactions are weakest, which sets the scope. Weak interactions are targeted
because open systems will always have flows of inputs and outputs across the boundary,
but if these flows are weak compared to internal interactions, they can be either ignored
logically equivalent to the appearance of its complement, and vice versa. This is why it is not possible to
separate the roles of assembly and breakdown in emergence.
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or aggregated, and a systems analysis should accurately capture first order features of the
system.
Secondly, once the scope of the system is set, deciding the resolution is usually straightfor-
ward. If the scope is the biosphere, it is currently infeasible to model at the resolution of
individual molecules. If the scope is an individual molecule, then the resolution will need
to be significantly finer if we want to say anything useful about the system. Limitations on
the available cognitive and/or information processing resources provides an upper bound
on the practical resolution for observing a system of any given scope, and since the upper
bound is Pareto dominant with respect to information, observers could be expected to
be near the Pareto frontier (ignoring extremely small scopes). Thus, limitations on in-
formation processing provides an approximately linear inversely proportional relationship
between scope and resolution. Just like a camera’s zoom lens, varying the scope auto-
matically adjusts the resolution, and automatic processes are subconscious and hardwired,
rather than conscious, deliberate and justified.
Thirdly, now that the scope and resolution are known, the system is composed of a finite
number of components. Emergent properties belong to the system if they do not occur in
the absence of the system, and are not properties of the components taken separately or
in other combinations.
A number of issues arise from this kind of approach to defining a system. The most obvious
problem is because it is subconscious, intuitive and unstated, it is not subject to criticism
or debate. The definition of the system is axiomatic, and despite its crucial role in the
success or failure of all subsequent analysis, it is placed beyond question, or rather slipped
in beneath questioning. In addition, the open nature of most systems of interest means
specifying a unique boundary is problematic. At what point does the flow of matter,
energy and information stop being part of the environment and start being part of the
system? Finally, we showed in Section 4.2 that this approach leads to the idea of emergent
behaviours, whereby emergent properties are assigned to the system, when the system is
only one component of the structure extending between the system and its environment
that gives rise to the emergent property.
Defn. 4 enables an alternative approach for identifying the boundaries of a system. Firstly,
a system is defined by a set of properties {p1, p2, ..., pn} that characterise and identify that
system. Secondly, for each property i, the minimal macrostate M∗i is identified, which
associates that property with a particular scope, SM∗
i
. Thirdly, the system boundary is
defined as the set union of the scope for each property,
⋃n
i=1 SM∗i . Finally, the resolution
must be at least as fine as the highest resolution minimal macrostate. By starting from a
set of emergent properties, the process is explicit and justified; flows from the environment
are included in the system boundary only when they are a necessary component of a system
property; and every property must belong to a subset of the system’s components. The
ontological nature of novel emergent properties means the system boundaries derived from
them are not arbitrary, but reflect features of the system that are independent of the
observer.
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It may be argued that in practice, it is never possible to list every property of a system.
This is not a major limitation due to the nature of the union operator. When a subset
of the set of all system properties is considered, {p1, p2, ..., pk}, with k < n, the derived
system boundary represents a lower bound on the actual system boundary. This is easy
to see, since
⋃k
i=1 SM∗i ⊆
⋃n
i=1 SM∗i . Further, as new properties are added to the subset,
the derived system boundary must converge from below to the actual system boundary.
Using this procedure, we can approach a representation of a system’s boundary, whose
only dependence on the observer is deciding on the set of properties to be associated with
the system.
7 Practical Limitations
The analysis above has helped to clarify the role resolution and scope play in emergent
properties of substantial systems with a unique, well defined microstate. Mathematical
examples are useful because truth is accessible within the rules of the axiomatic system.
It is possible to analytically show properties of microstates and macrostates, avoiding
problems such as the theory-ladenness of observation that arise when properties must be
detected empirically. Unfortunately, a number of such issues limit our ability to decisively
show the presence of emergent properties and emergence in the real world. One of the
most difficult aspects of identifying emergent properties in natural examples is choosing
the resolution for the macrostate, which determines what are considered to be components.
If a novel emergent property is present with respect to one set of components, but not for
another way of defining the components, is the property really emergent? If there exists any
way of defining the components, such that the emergent property is present in a microstate
with narrower scope, then the novel emergent property does not belong to the macrostate.
The property is still emergent, but we have just attributed it to the wrong scope, because
of our choice of resolution. In general our decision procedure cannot check every possible
resolution, so in practice applying Defn. 4 could overestimate the scope of the minimal
macrostate.
Microstates and macrostates are defined in Section 3 to cater for an ensemble perspective.
Although this has not been required in the examples above, except to capture temporal
structure, it will often be required for physical systems. When considering sufficiently fine
microstates (either quantum or semi-classical), observations of a system over time cannot be
performed on the same microstate, but rather on the ensemble of states. In this situation,
a single microstate is not physically observable and therefore is not a physically meaningful
concept [7]. This means we need to take an ensemble perspective [7], which complicates
the process of observation by making it statistical, but it is still entirely compatible with
the framework developed in this study.
To quote Zadeh [38], “[m]ore often than not, the classes of objects encountered in the
real physical world do not have precisely defined criteria of membership”. If a property is
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either statistical or fuzzy, there will not be a discontinuous boundary between emergent
and non-emergent. For example, a self-avoiding random walk has the property of almost
completely unstructured movement when the scope of the microstate is one move, and
the property of considerably structured, statistically self-similar movement when the scope
of the macrostate is a large number of moves. The emergent property of statistical self-
similarity is satisfied with greater confidence as the temporal scope of the macrostate
broadens. In this case, the scope associated with the novel emergent property will be
somewhat arbitrary. However, we can at least specify bounds on the associated scope,
such that below the lower bound the novel emergent property does not exist, while it
exists with an arbitrary degree of confidence above the upper bound on scope.
There exist many systems that are not studied according to the distribution of their physical
substance, including formal (mathematical) systems and social systems. In these systems,
a convenient property of physical systems is absent. In physical systems, entropy is well
defined by the quantum difference given by Planck’s constant h [6, p13]. This means there
exists only a finite number of distinct possibilities. Even though formal and social systems
must both ultimately have physical instantiations, they do not have obvious bounds (anal-
ogous to Planck’s constant) on possibilities. For instance, although the number of distinct
thoughts a human mind will have in its lifetime is finite, we apparently cannot specify in
advance any finite set containing every possible thought, nor determine the finest possible
distinction between two thoughts the mind is capable of making. In mathematical systems,
the bounds on scope and resolution are even less obvious (real numbers in general contain
infinite information), which is why mathematics is sometimes described as the study of
all possible worlds. If the distinct possibilities are not bounded, then resolution may not
be a meaningful concept, and the microstate may contain infinite information. In order
to apply this framework to non-physical systems, spaces must first be approximated with
a finite product space of possibilities, so that the microstate and resolution are both well
defined.
8 Practical Applications
The preceding mathematical examples are useful because of their simplicity and precision.
This section will not be precise or conclusive, but rather suggestive of real world examples
of emergence. The aim is to provide a few hooks for some of the many disciplines that
investigate emergent phenomena.
Simple machines such as pulleys and levers provide a mechanical advantage by decreasing
the amount of force required to do a given amount of work. In isolation, simple machines
increase the scale of effect of the energy source, which by Section 5 is not emergence,
or transform energy between forms. However, when a collection of simple machines are
assembled to form a compound machine, it is possible that the compound machine has
an emergent property that no proper subset of the parts and the energy source exhibit.
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Usually, these emergent properties are thought of as either the function of the compound
machine, or unintended consequences. A particularly vivid example of emergent function-
ality is given by Rube Goldberg machines, named after the American cartoonist who drew
improbable machines for performing simple tasks. The board game Mousetrap, and the
computer game The Incredible Machine, are both instantiations of Rube Goldberg ma-
chines where no proper subset of the system components can achieve the functionality of
the complete system. Almost all engineered systems – clocks, radios, computers, and aero-
planes – are designed for specific, predictable emergent properties. However, note that to
provide robust functionality, most engineered systems contain redundancy, which means
the system contains more components than the minimal macrostate. Also note that if the
emergent function is a behaviour, then by Section 4.2 the emergent property is formally a
property of the larger system in which the engineered system is used.
In chemistry, a catalyst decreases the activation energy of a chemical reaction. An auto-
catalytic set is defined as a reaction system (M,R) of molecules M and reactions R, such
that all the catalysts for all its reactions R are in M . If no proper subset of (M,R) is
an autocatalytic set, then the reaction system has the emergent property of catalytic clo-
sure. Some researchers, such as Kauffman [24, p329], have linked certain forms of catalytic
closure with the ability to generate heritable variation, and consequently to evolve under
the pressure of natural selection. Although the speculative claims of artificial chemistry
have not yet been empirically demonstrated, autocatalysis is an obvious candidate for the
emergence of novelty in chemistry.
In biology, many synergies have been studied that may be examples of emergence. The link
between synergy and emergence has been made by Corning [16], who defines synergy as
“the combined (cooperative) effects that are produced by two or more particles, elements,
parts, or organisms – effects that are not otherwise attainable”. Once again, a cautionary
remark obtains that greater efficiency through synergy is just scaling, not emergence. One
synergy that does appear to be due to emergent properties is obligate endosymbiosis, such
as the relationship between the Olavius algarvensis Oligochaete – a gutless marine worm
– and the chemoautotrophic bacteria that lives inside it. Under certain conditions (such
as the absence of an external source of reduced sulphur compounds), neither organism
can survive in isolation. However, a syntrophic sulphur cycle recycles oxidised and reduced
sulphur between the symbionts, which is believed to have enabled O. algarvensis to colonise
new habitats and extend their geographic distribution [19].
Another biological example demonstrates how emergent properties can be either spatially
or temporally extended. Cyanobacteria are a remarkably diverse group of prokaryotes.
Different species that engage in the chemically incompatible processes of nitrogen fixing
and photosynthesis have evolved different solutions to work around this obstacle. Anabaena
spatially separates the processes in separate heterocysts and passes the products between
cells using filaments [35]. In contrast, Synechococcus temporally separates the processes,
performing photosynthesis during the day and nitrogen fixation at night [18]. Yet another
species, Trichodesmium both spatially and temporally separates the processes [8]. All three
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species have the same emergent property, which since it cannot be a property of a single
component, must be distributed in space, time, or both space and time.
In economics, games such as the tragedy of the commons [20] and prisoner’s dilemma [33]
capture a mathematical representation of the difference between local and global structure.
In these games, pursuit of a local maximum in the microstate (one player’s payoff) prevents
the players from maximising the macrostate (the total payoff to all players). The structure
of the games and greedy rational behaviour combine to ensure a sub-optimal Nash equilib-
rium will prevail, even when a solution exists where all players could have received greater
payoffs. This kind of outcome results because the scope of consideration of greedy rational
players is too narrow. If the negative externalities of the actions of individual players are
incorporated into the payoff (which broadens the scope of what each player pays attention
to), then the structure of the game changes and the equilibrium will no longer be domi-
nated by other combinations of strategies. The game is now factored, meaning any increase
in the payoff to one player does not decrease the total payoff to all players [37]. The point
at which incorporating the cost of negative externalities into the payoff matrix results in
a factored game is the scope associated with this emergent property. The applications of
game theory are of course much wider than just economics. There are many games with a
similar difference between local and global structure, such as Braess’ Paradox [10], where
adding extra capacity to a network can reduce global performance, and Parrondo’s para-
dox [21], where playing two losing games can be a winning strategy overall. In Parrondo’s
paradox, scope has a different meaning (playing each game in isolation or in conjunction),
but the emergent property is still coupled to scope.
9 Summary
Due to its central position in systems approaches, a redefinition of emergence has significant
implications for systems research. The definitions in this study do not directly contradict
the common view that emergent properties at one level are meaningless at the level below.
However, they do provide a deeper understanding that represents a substantial refinement
of the common conception. A simple explanation of emergent properties is given in terms
of scope, which forms the basis of a normative definition of emergent properties and sub-
sequently for emergence. That is, rather than just describing what emergent properties
are like, our definition prescribes the conditions whereby a property should be formally
considered to be emergent.
Defn. 1 is so general it is trivial. Given almost any macrostate, we can choose a microstate
with a sufficiently small scope that the macrostate has an emergent property relative to
that microstate. If almost every macrostate has emergent properties, the definition is
meaningless. This is why the idea of the minimal macrostate M∗ is crucial. M∗ allows
emergent properties to be coupled to a specific scope. Defn. 4 is more specific, because
it only counts emergent properties when they are not a property of any microstate with
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smaller scope. Consequently, only a small fraction of macrostates have novel emergent
properties.
A number of phenomena have previously been lumped under the banner of emergence.
In this study, we found that the concept is currently too broad. Weak emergent proper-
ties must be excluded from emergence: the resolution of observation, or the language of
description has no bearing on whether a property is emergent. Emergent behaviour, or en-
vironmental emergence, must be reassessed as a novel emergent property of a system with
larger scope. A clear distinction was made between emergent properties and emergence,
which shows that simply scaling an emergent property cannot be considered emergence.
Lewes thought of emergents as the converse of resultants, while Broad recast emergentism
in opposition to mechanism. In this study, an emergent property is the converse of a
local property. This is consistent with Lewes, insofar as resultants represent linear com-
binations of existing localised components. Nonlinearity is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for an emergent property. In contrast, if a property is non-local, it is spatially or
temporally extended, and necessarily emergent, so this opposition is more revealing. The
relationship with Broad’s antonym is less clear, since it depends on how strictly mechanism
is interpreted. Under the purest interpretation of mechanism, local properties should tell
us everything there is to know about a system, and there is no potential for naissance
emergence. However, pure mechanism is not really a serious metaphysical position, and
contrasting it with emergentism does little to reveal what emergent properties are. The
view of emergence in this study seems to be most compatible with non-reductive physical-
ism, although it is not our intent to advocate a particular ontology. In summary, Defn.
1 not only enables us to say what emergent properties are, it also allows us to better say
what they are not.
As long as there exist possible configurations of our universe that have not yet occurred, we
must be realistic about our ability to predict future dynamics on the basis of formal systems,
when the dynamics may be influenced by emergence. This insight is the most profound
implication of emergence, yet also the most difficult aspect of emergence to demonstrate
constructively, by virtue of its absence in formal systems.
The alternative to level and hierarchy – scope, resolution and state – offers a generic
framework for analysing systems. Because the primitives are well-defined for any physical
system, they should have broad applicability in systems research. An obvious direction for
further research is to supplement these primitives with other concepts to provide a more
powerful formalism.
Given that science has always valued depth of knowledge over breadth, it is not surprising
that a scientific understanding of emergence has not been forthcoming, when emergent
properties are precisely the properties that cannot be understood with additional depth.
The existence of emergent properties provides legitimation for broader systems approaches
that complement specialised scientific disciplines. However, this insight is not articulated
in discussions of emergence based on levels, because in general a level is an indeterminate
18
mixture between relationships of scope and resolution. By revealing the coupling between
emergence and scope, it is hoped that the dialogue on emergence can achieve coherence.
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